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INTRODUCTION
This paper is motivated by parallel trends in education and labour market developments in Australia and Britain, particularly with respect to higher education. In Australia, university participation rates rose from 24.4% in 1988 to 38.0% in 1999 but the increase was much greater for women -from 22.1% to 41.6% than for men -27.3% to 33.2% (Chapman and Ryan, 2003) . In Britain, the proportion of young people studying full time in universities increased from 13% in 1980 to 33% in 2000, with a government set target of 50%. Between 1990/91 and 2000/01 the number of male undergraduates increased by over one third and the number of females almost doubled (Elias and Purcell, 2003) . 1 The increase in the number of persons with qualifications in the labour market has given rise to concerns about the possibility of employer-employee mis-matches in terms of the failure of educated individuals to obtain jobs commensurate with their qualifications.
Traditionally this mis-match has been called over-education and has been measured by the proportion of educated individuals who work in jobs where their qualifications are not necessary. This mis-match has been measured in terms of over-education, with a general over-education rate of as much as 30% of the workforce being reported in both Australia and Britain. A common result in the literature is that over-educated persons are also under-paid for their qualifications. However, doubts remain about the extent to which this mis-match represents a form of market failure and the extent to which it represents inferior quality in those individuals subject to it. One of the major problems in the 1 Chapman and Ryan (2003) report internal rates of return for graduates in Australia of 13.1% for men and 12.6% for women in 1997/98, while O' Leary and Sloane (2005) report rates of return for graduates in England and Wales averaged over the period 1994-2002 of 10.1% for men and 15.0% for women. Thus, staying on represents a better investment for women in Britain than for men, while there is no discernible difference in Australia.
empirical over-education literature is that it cannot distinguish between the case where an observed overeducated person is (i) well-matched but paid less because there is some other (unobserved by the data) compensating differential at play, or (ii) not well-matched and therefore being paid less due to a market failure. As with many empirical investigations involving the estimation of the relationship between education and labour market performance, the inability of the over-education measures in the literature to account for unobserved ability introduces serious problems regarding the interpretation of empirical results. The fact that these two competing explanations of what over-education means clearly lends itself to very different policy implications, making the results from the over-education literature limited in their policy usefulness.
This paper overcomes this problem by using a variable which measures directly and more generally the mismatch between employer and employee. We use information on reported overskilling in the workplace which is measured by employed individuals reporting the degree to which they utilise their skills and abilities in their workplace. To do this, we make use of questions in recent data sets, namely the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey and the 2004 British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) which both ask respondents about the extent they are able to use their abilities and previously acquired skills on the job. This measure of mis-match in the workplace seems less likely to be biased through failure to control for unobserved ability differences. Over-education and overskilling, however, may be measuring different things. Green and McIntosh (2002) found, for example, that less than half the over-educated were also over-skilled. Using the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) they estimated that over 20 percent of the British workforce were overskilled and 4 percent under-skilled, with significant wage effects for both groups. Of course, eliminating over-education implies moving a worker up the job hierarchy, while eliminating overskilling can be achieved by the employer re-organising work in existing jobs as well as promoting workers to higher ranked jobs. Promotion will be more easily achieved in well-developed internal labour markets.
It has become conventional to use some version of assignment theory (Sattinger, 1993) to explain the existence of mis-matches in the workplace. This theory suggests that both demand and supply factors explain the level of wages and that, if the employers' demand for different levels of skill is not matched by equivalent levels of the supply of skills, some mis-matching is inevitable. This will be more likely when there is rapid technological change as adjustment takes time, both in creating new types of skill and training workers in these new skills. Allen and van der Velden (2001) and Allen, BadilloAmador and van der Velden (2006) argue in fact that there is an implicit assumption in the above theory that educational mis-matches give rise to skill mis-matches and it is the latter that lead to negative wage effects. This in turn implies that education and skill mismatches should be highly correlated and that skill mis-matches should still show a negative effect on wages after controlling for educational mis-matches. Allen, BadilloAmador and van der Velden (2006) also hypothesise that educational mis-matches will be associated with stronger wage effects and skill mis-matches with weaker wage effects in those countries with strong wage setting institutions compared to countries with more market-based wage setting processes. They test these hypotheses on a 2005 survey of graduates across nine countries (including Britain), which includes data on both educational and skills mis-match. In single country studies that use data sets containing comparable information, Allen and van der Velden (2001) , Green and McIntosh (2002) and Di Prieto and Urwin (2006) all found that there was little support for the above hypotheses with skill mis-matches having little effect on wages after controlling for educational qualifications. These results were largely confirmed by their nine country study, but Britain was an exception with the strong effects of overskilling remaining and a sizeable decrease in the effect of over-education occurring with the introduction of the former. It should be noted that both Britain and Australia (which was not included in the above study) have market based wage setting arrangements. Neither of our two data sets have questions on over-education, although it is possible to derive a measure of it.
One of the main questions addressed in this paper is whether there is a sizeable wage penalty associated with overskilling in both Britain and Australia. If we find that overskilling imposes a wage penalty with current graduate numbers, then this will raise the question of what will happen with future increases in their number to which both Australia and Britain are committed. This has implications both for the type of graduates produced and the use that is made of them by employers. Key questions are whether overskilling follows a similar pattern in the two countries and whether the same is true of the wage penalty.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the Australian and British data sets that are used in this paper. Section 3 investigates the relationship between over-education 5 and overskilling. As the paper argues that the overskilling question contains different information from what the traditional over-education variables contain, it is necessary that these differences be established. Section 4 presents the bulk of the estimation results.
These contain comparisons of the wage impact of overskilling for different parts of the labour force in both Australia and Britain. Section 5 investigates the possible impact of job discretion in the presence of overskilling, using some information present in the British data set. Section 6 concludes. An appendix contains detailed tables.
THE DATA
HILDA The HILDA measure of overskilling is derived from responses scored on a seven point scale to the statement "I use many of my skills and abilities in my current job." A response of 1 corresponds to strongly disagree and 7 to strongly agree. The WERS measure is derived from responses to the question "How well do the skills you personally have match the skills you need to do your present job?". There is a five point scale with respondents answering that their own skills are much higher, a bit higher, about the same, a bit lower and much lower than needed. In this paper we use these two measures of overskilling. Using HILDA, individuals selecting 1, 2 or 3 on the scale are classified as severely over-skilled, those selecting 4 or 5 as moderately over-skilled and those selecting 6 or 7 as well matched (the reference category in regression analysis). In the HILDA sample, 30.6 percent are moderately over-skilled and 11.5 percent are severely over-skilled. In WERS, 31.9 percent have skills a bit higher than needed in their job, and 21.1 percent much higher than needed. Whilst moderate overskilling appears to be equally prevalent in Australia and Britain, this way of cutting the data suggests a much higher prevalence of severe overskilling in Britain than in Australia.
OVEREDUCATION AND OVERSKILLING
Given the recent emphasis placed on the relationship between overeducation and overskilling as means for assessing theoretical models of labour markets Van der Velden 2001 and , we need to consider in some detail the empirical relationship between these two variables. The overskilling variable used in this study represents a more direct measure of mismatch relative to over-education, given that respondents are asked to benchmark directly all their skills (innate, schooling and experience-related)
against the actual requirements of their job. Over-education, on the other hand, represents a much more indirect measure of mismatch as it uses educational attainment as a proxy for skills possessed and compares this against job entry requirements which are used to proxy job requirements. There are numerous reasons why the over-education proxies may not accurately reflect either acquired skills or job content and, as such, it is reasonable to expect some divergence between the over-education and overskilling estimates.
However, a low correlation between measures does not necessarily imply inaccuracy. For instance, Battu, Belfield and Sloane (2000) examined the level of correlation between different measures of over-education derived from two separate panels of data (1985 and 1990) . Despite poor correlation between the measures (as low as 20 per cent in some cases), the authors report that the various approaches generate similar results with respect to the effect of over-education on earnings. Green and McIntosh (2002) use a somewhat broader definition of overskilling than the one adopted here, and report a level of 8 correlation between over-education and overskilling that is somewhat higher, with around 50 per cent of all overeducated British workers reported to be also over-skilled.
We assess the strength of the over-education / overskilling relationship using the HILDA data only. The WERS data was considered to be unsuitable for such an analysis due to difficulties associated with deriving over-education measures 2 . We adopt 3 overeducation measures; all are variations of the empirical method and are estimated at the 2 digit level. The over-education definitions employed are as follows: Given that the estimated rate of mismatch under the overskilling approach is at least twice that of over-education using methods 1 and 3, the proportions of over-skilled workers who are also over-educated are much lower (see Table 2 ). The greatest level of consistency was again with definitions 1 and 3 where between 21 and 25 percent of severely over-skilled and between 16 and 20 per cent of moderately over-skilled workers have been identified as over-educated. Unsurprisingly, the proportion of over-skilled workers identified as over-educated under definition 3 was extremely low. Nevertheless, the variation in the rates of over-skilled workers who are also overeducated enables us to gain some further insights into the relationship between the two variables. It has recently been argued, as noted in the Introduction, that the inclusion of an overeducation variable in a wage equation containing an overskilling variable constitutes an effective test of the job assignment theory. Allen et al. (2006) argue that the assignment theory can be rejected on the grounds that the overeducation coefficients remain unchanged when the wage equation is adjusted to include controls for overskilling. This seems a somewhat extreme interpretation given that the low impact on the overskilling variable could well be due to the low rate of correlation between the two variables. The point is illustrated in Table 3 , which presents the results of estimations which contain overskilling alone (Model 1), over-education alone (Model 2) and both overskilling and over-education (Model 3). 3 As expected, the impact on the overskilling variables is greatest under over-education definitions 1 and 3 which were more heavily correlated with overskilling, whereas the impact of the much more weakly related definition 2 was negligible. The results suggest that the magnitude of adjustment on the coefficients will simply reflect the level of correlation between the overskilling and over-education 3 All previous covariates were also included but are omitted from the table for convenience purposes.
11 measure and, therefore, it is potentially misleading to place a heavy emphasis upon the outcomes of such simulations. Note: Dependent variable is weekly wages. Standard errors in brackets. HILDA survey waves 4 and 5. ***/**/* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
In conclusion, the two variables of overskilling and overeducation appear to be different in the information they contain. The overskilling variable is likely to be more attractive to use for estimation purposes as it links the level of the employee skills with current job needs more directly than the overeducation variable which looks only at formal qualifications. A crucial empirical observation in this context is that the coefficients of the overskilling variable in a wage equation are robust to the inclusion of the overeducation variable in the estimation.
PATTERNS OF OVERSKILLING IN AUSTRALIA AND BRITAIN
We focus on full-time employees only, using weekly earnings 4 and correcting for usual The results presented in Tables 4a and 4b suggest that overskilling is more prevalent in Britain than in Australia and is distributed differently. In Australia, severe overskilling declines from over 18 percent for those completing education below year 10 to less than 10 percent for undergraduates, averaging 14 percent, while in Britain it is invariant to highest education level at around 18-21 percent.
Thus, Britain's overskilling problem is more severe in two respects -it is more extensive overall and it is distributed proportionately more at the higher skill end of the labour market. Considering first occupations in Tables 5a and 5b , the distribution of overskilling over the two countries is consistent in so far as its incidence is inversely related to occupational level, but the extent to which incidence changes with respect to occupational distribution is very different. In Australia less than five percent of managers and administrators are severely over-skilled, while the comparable figure for Britain is 16 percent. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS
We estimate a standard wage regression in which the log of weekly wages is regressed on a vector of characteristics for individual i in workplace j: ε is a standard iid error term.
In Table 7 we assess the effects of overskilling on earnings for all full-time employees in the two countries. In each case earnings are significantly lower for the over-skilled: by 8.2 percent for the severely over-skilled in Australia and by 12.0 percent in Britain. For the moderately over-skilled, the corresponding figures are 2.5 and 2.9 percent respectively. Thus, Britain suffers not only from more extensive overskilling than Australia, but also from a greater negative impact on earnings. Women earn 12 percent less than men in Australia and 14% less than men in Britain. The mark-up to obtaining a degree compared to no qualification is 42% in Australia and 56% in Britain, with corresponding figures for postgraduates being 51% in Australia and 68% in Britain respectively. Those who are not married earn 6.8 and 5.7% less than those who are married. Age-earnings profiles follow the expected inverted U-shaped pattern and earnings also increase with tenure. Reference groups are as follows: age 16-17; education attainment below yr 10; employed with current employer for less than a year; employed on continuing contract with a firm that employs at least 50 people. ***/**/* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Supervisory status has a much stronger effect in Britain, while trade union membership, which is significant in Australia, is insignificant in Britain. 5 A number of other variables such as employer size, children and temporary contracts have a similar effect in each country and are shown in detail in Table A7 in the Appendix. The overall conclusion from Table 7 is that, so far as wages and skills go, the main manifestation of mis-matches in the labour market is amongst those who perceive themselves as severely over-skilled.
Despite the inclusion of a large number of human capital variables as well as variables that relate to the employers, the wage penalty due to severe overskilling remains at 8 percent in Australia and 12 percent in Britain. This means that severe overskilling is associated with labour market mis-matches. Considering that the wage penalty will only be one part of the loss generated by a mis-match (the other part will be lost output and profit for the employer), the estimated wage penalties presented in this paper can be thought of as a fraction of the total productivity losses resulting from severe overskilling.
Reported moderate overskilling yields different results with a lesser empirical presence.
Although the estimated wage penalties are significant for both Australia and Britain, their sizes are only 2.5 and 2.9 percent respectively. Nevertheless, given the large number of individuals that report moderate overskilling, the estimated small per person wage penalty (and the implied productivity loss) could add up to sizeable economy-wide losses.
Next we consider separately how the wage penalty differs amongst the different categories of educational qualifications in Table 8 . We have defined six categories and we present them all. There do not appear to be any wage penalties for both severe and moderate overskilling in both Australia and Britain for the lowest education category. These are the people with the largest proportion of reported overskilling, but they do not appear to be penalised for their overskilling after their own and their employers' characteristics have been controlled for. One possible explanation is that their pay is very close to a lower bound defined by the minimum wage legislation that both countries have in place. This simply precludes the presence of any wage penalty. With the year 10/GCSE category, a considerable wage penalty appears in Australia for both severe (11.3%) and moderate (7%) overskilling and a modest wage penalty only for severe overskilling (5%) in Britain.
The implication is that there are severe mis-matches in this education category in Australia, but not so much in Britain.
Moving to categories with higher educational attainment, most of the wage penalty estimates for moderate overskilling disappear, with only a modest 4 percent penalty for those in possession of certificates and diplomas in Australia and a 5.8 and 9.6 percent penalty for those with graduate and postgraduate qualifications respectively in Britain.
All remaining action is concentrated on the severe overskilling wage penalties, which increase as education levels rise. In all (comparable) education categories from year 11 and higher, the wage penalty for overskilling is higher in Britain than in Australia. The highest wage penalty for severe overskilling in Britain appears to be amongst those who completed an undergraduate degree (at 20.3%) followed closely by those with a postgraduate degree (at 18.3%). Similarly, the highest wage penalty for severe overskilling in Australia is amongst those who completed an undergraduate degree (at 22 15.9%), almost equal to that for postgraduate degree holders (at 15.7%), although it should be noted that this last estimate is not very precise. It is noteworthy that the overskilling wage penalty for those with vocational qualifications (certificates) is considerably lower than all categories with education from year 11 and higher in both countries.
To the extent that these different levels of education may generate a different mix of general and specific human capital (broadly speaking, the category 'Year 11-12/A-level'
has a higher ratio of general/specific human capital than the category 'Certificates'), this may be an important finding. Another important observation that arises from Table 8 is that the wage effects of overskilling and any associated mis-match generated productivity losses are present in a much larger proportion of the labour market than the overeducation literature suggests, where the analysis is limited to University graduates or similar. In Table 8 , conditional estimates and sample sizes show that in Australia a penalty of around 10 percent and more applies to 61 percent of the Australian labour force and 79 percent of the British labour force. Table 9 looks briefly at the gender dimension of the overskilling issue, with detailed results given in Table A9 in the Appendix. In Australia, the wage penalty is greater for severely over-skilled males relative to severely over-skilled females (9.5% compared to 5.7%). There is no significant penalty for moderately over-skilled Australian males, whereas for females there is a significant negative effect on wages of 3.8%. In Britain, the effects are generally stronger with a wage penalty of 12.4% for severely over-skilled males, 11.4% for severely over-skilled females, 2.4% for moderately over-skilled males and 4.0% for moderately over-skilled females. Gender differences in the overskilling penalty are only present in Australia and for the severely over-skilled. Looking at the results as a whole, males are more damaged than females by being severely over-skilled in both countries and females are more damaged than males for being moderately overskilled in both countries. 
JOB DISCRETION AND OVERSKILLING
It has been argued in the over-education literature that over-educated workers may be able to change the nature of their job in such a way as to minimise the effects of a mismatch. The degree to which they may be able to do this will depend on the extent to which they have job discretion. The WERS data set, but not the HILDA survey, contains questions relating to job discretion in the employee questionnaire. Employees are asked "overall, how satisfied are you with the amount of involvement you have in decisionmaking at this workplace?". They are also asked how satisfied they are with the following aspects of their job: (i) the scope for using their own initiative and (ii) the amount of influence they have over their job. In each case there are five possible responses, ranging from very satisfied to very dissatisfied. We enter these into our earnings regressions as a series of dummies with the category "very dissatisfied" being the excluded (reference) category in all cases. We hypothesise that where workers are able to influence the way in which they work, this should raise their productivity and thus reduce their negative effect of overskilling on wages. We present the results from these regressions in the following Table 10 . 
Combined discretion variables
Note: In all job discretion variables the reference category is "very dissatisfied". *** imply significance at the 1 percent level. The same specification has been used as in all other regressions. Source: WERS 2004. Table 10 estimates the same wage regression with (Model 2) and without (Model 1) the discretion variables in the right hand side. All three discretion variables produce very similar results. First, discretion and wages are positively associated. Second, the relationship is particularly strong where discretion is at its highest. Third, the association is statistically significant at all levels of discretion. The variable "involvement in decision-making" appears to be the one with the strongest association with wages, as it is probably the one with the clearest definition in the workplace. It has to be noted that this can be a variable with considerable endogeneity in the context of wage regressions, as discretion may generate higher wages and higher wages may simply be the result of wellused past discretion. The data at hand does not allow us to test this, but what is evident in the present context is that when each of the discretion variables are present in the estimation the overskilling coefficients are lower. The largest reduction in the overskilling coefficient occurs when all discretion variables are introduced together: the negative effect of severe overskilling on wage drops by 14 percent and that of moderate overskilling drops by 13 percent. It should be noted that, although the relationship between job discretion and the wage penalty caused by overskilling is weak, it is very precisely estimated.
CONCLUSION
The phenomenon of overskilling is present in both Australia and Britain, but more so in the latter and particularly so for those with degree qualifications. There are also wage penalties associated with overskilling in both countries, with the effects being stronger in
Britain. For the severely over-skilled, the wage penalties are larger for men than for women, while this pattern (albeit with lower estimates) is reversed for the moderately over-skilled. When the data are split by highest educational qualifications, the wage penalties are seen to be greater for degree holders, but the prevalence of overskilling is higher for the lower education levels. Overskilling is found to be less prevalent amongst graduates, but is also found to carry the highest wage penalty amongst graduates. Thus, in general, the problem of overskilling is greater in the case of graduates and particularly so in Britain.
In this paper we have argued that overskilling is a more appropriate measure of labour market mis-match than over-education, because workers' responses to the overskilling question should incorporate differences in abilities and differences with regards to the real demands of jobs. Although abilities and job demands are anything between unobservable to only imperfectly observed, the overskilling response provides a unique insight in this direction. We find some evidence that increased job discretion is associated with lower penalties for overskilling which, though small in magnitude, illustrates the fact that employers can moderate the effects of mis-matches by responding positively to the perceptions of the workforce and involving them more in decisions about how work is carried out.
Overskilling may occur because some workers choose less onerous jobs, but whether or not this is the case, it always represents a financial loss to the employee which ultimately may lead to unintended losses in job satisfaction and productivity with associated losses to the employer also. Overskilling has the potential also to lower returns to the state 27 insofar as lower earnings result in lower contributions towards the repayment of income contingent loans.
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Employment tenure->10 years: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual is employed with current employer for more than 10 years, zero otherwise (Australia and UK).
Employed on fixed term: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual is employed on fixed term contracts, zero otherwise (Australia and UK).
Casual worker: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if individual is employed on casual basis, zero otherwise (Australia and UK).
Firm that employs less than 5 people: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if the firm the individual is employed at employs less than 5 people, zero otherwise (Australia and UK).
Firm that employs between 5-9 people: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if the firm the individual is employed at employs between 5 and 9 people, zero otherwise (Australia and UK). 0.4852 Notes: ***/**/* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
Full regression results
a For UK, the equivalent variable is "Educational attainment -GCSEs or equivalent" b For UK, the equivalent variable is "Educational attainment -A-levels or equivalent" c For UK, the equivalent variable is "Educational attainment -Other academic or vocational" d For UK, the variable is "Have children aged between 5 and 18" e For UK, the variable is "Worked at a firm that employs between 10-24 people" f For UK, the variable is "Worked at a firm that employs between 25-49 people" g For UK, the variable is "Industry-Public Administration" h For UK, the variable is "Industry-other Community Services" a For UK, the variable is "Worked at a firm that employs between 10-24 people" b For UK, the variable is "Worked at a firm that employs between 25-49 people"
